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Abstract
Purpose To study the cognitive processes of early-stage prostate
cancer patients as they determined which treatment they preferred,
using our cognitively based decision aid.
Method The aid was a one-to-one interview that included the
structured presentation of information, listing exercises in which the
patient identiﬁed attributes important to his decision, and trade-oﬀ
exercises to help him weigh and integrate those attributes together.
At various points of the interview, patients identiﬁed the attributes
they felt were important to their decision, rated their treatment
options and completed standardized assessments relating to their
decision. In addition, patients participated in a follow-up interview
at the time they made their actual treatment decision and again
3 months later.
Results Sixty of 70 (86%) of the invited patients participated in the
study. Participating patients identiﬁed a median of four important
attributes (range 1–10); 36 diﬀerent attributes were identiﬁed at
some point in the interview by the group. During the interview, 78%
of patients changed which attributes they considered important, and
72% changed their treatment ratings. Stability of treatment choice
after the interview and lack of regret after the decision were each
positively associated with increasing diﬀerentiation between treat-
ment options over time.
Conclusions The decision process appears to be dynamic for the
patients with great variability across patients in what is important
to the decision. Increasing stability of choice and lack of regret
appear to be related positively to increasing diﬀerence over time
in how attractive the preferred option is over its closest
competitor, rather than to the size of the diﬀerence at any one
point in time.
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Introduction
While there is general agreement that decision
aids inmedical settings are interventions designed
to help patients participate in decisions about
their health care, there is less agreement on what
the aids should include or what they should
accomplish. Reviews of decision aids have noted
that the aids often focus exclusively on informa-
tion provision.1,2 Unlike the educational pro-
grammes that provide information, decision aids
are intended to help the patient through the
decision process, but only a few aim to do so
explicitly.1,2
What decision aids should be designed to
accomplish is controlled, to some extent, by our
views of the limitations faced by decision mak-
ers. Herbert Simon3 viewed humans as funda-
mentally rational decision makers but hampered
by limited resources such as memory and energy.
The resource limitations lead to the use of
resource-reducing short-cut strategies, or heu-
ristics, but at a cost of being less thorough.4
Because being thorough is integral to rationality,
one approach for decision aids is to help patients
by augmenting their limited processing res-
ources;5 the augmentation would in turn limit
the need for heuristics that would compromise
the decision. The potential impact of such
decision aids is illustrated by experimental evi-
dence that they can be designed to encourage the
use of the more comprehensive, and therefore
more resource demanding, compensatory
decision rules.6–8
To build a decision aid that could augment
patients cognitive resources, one needs to iden-
tify the cognitive processes that people typically
use when making decisions and then identify the
likely resource limitations. Svenson’s Diﬀeren-
tiation and Consolidation (Diﬀ Con) theory, a
descriptive ‘‘process theory’’2 of decision making,
provides such a framework. Diﬀ Con is one of
the more comprehensive process theories (see
also9–11) and it explicitly describes processes that
people typically engage in when making complex
decisions in novel situations.12,13
According to Diﬀ Con, people make decisions
to achieve particular goals. The decision
processes aim to make one alternative (of those
oﬀered) suﬃciently superior over its compet-
itor(s) that it should be able to withstand both
internal (e.g. a change of own values) and
external (e.g. a poor outcome) threats to its
selection as the preferred alternative. The
superiority of the preferred alternative is created
through the application of decision rules and
restructuring processes, called ‘‘diﬀerentiation’’;
‘‘consolidation’’ describes the same processes
but they occur after the decision has been made.
Central to Diﬀ Con is the assumption that suf-
ﬁcient restructuring (diﬀerentiation and consol-
idation) protects the decision maker from
threats, and those threats can manifest them-
selves in our experiencing cognitive dissonance
and/or regret. A decision aid based on Diﬀ Con,
therefore, would aim to help patients increase
the diﬀerence in attractiveness between the pre-
ferred option and the other alternatives by
encouraging diﬀerentiation and consolidation.
We have designed a decision aid, guided by Diﬀ
Con, that allows us to study patients cognitive
processes as they ﬁgure out the treatment option
they prefer.
The lack of a gold standard for determining a
good decision14 makes evaluating decision aids
a challenge and it has been recognized that
appropriate evaluations of decision aids would
be driven to a large extent by the theory
underlying the aid.15 Svenson (see also Baron16)
suggests that we naturally make decisions to
achieve particular goals; thus, the ideal assess-
ment would be to determine if the decision aid
helped the patient achieve his goals. Many goals
diﬀer from one decision to the next; however,
Svenson and others17–19 suggest that a goal
common to all decisions is to limit the possibility
of regretting the decision at a later date. In spite
of the fact that regret can only be assessed after
the decision is made and its ultimate assessment
can only happen after all outcomes related to the
decision are fully experienced, our natural ten-
dency to consider regret when we make decisions
means that it is a natural outcome to evaluate.
Thus, assessing regret before all the decision’s
consequences are experienced may help us to
determine the potential of regret as an outcome
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measure. Our decision aid allows us to investi-
gate the potential for assessing regret and to
investigate how it relates to cognitive processes
that occur.
Treatment decisions for early-stage prostate
cancer are among those decisions that patients
ﬁnd particularly challenging (e.g. see Grove20).
At the time of the study, standard treatments
included three options: surgery, radiotherapy,
and no treatment for now (watchful waiting),
although not all patients are oﬀered all three
options. The decision typically requires pro-
cessing a large amount of information from
which pertinent risks and beneﬁts must be
identiﬁed and integrated, which clearly makes it
demanding of cognitive resources. It is even
more challenging because facing such a ‘‘high-
stakes’’ decision is typically a new experience for
the patient, and he often feels some urgency to
make a decision quickly but frequently is in an
emotional state that reduces his processing
resources.21,22 Thus, this treatment decision as
faced by these patients is particularly at risk of
being compromised by limited cognitive
resources.
The purpose of this report is to describe the
insights we have gained into patients cognitive
processing as they made their treatment deci-
sions using our process-oriented decision aid.
The insights help us better understand both
similarities and diﬀerences among the patients
within the group. Objectives related to studying
the cognitive processes were:
(1) to identify attributes that the patients con-
sidered important to their decision,
(2) to determine what patients identify as
particular challenges as they make their deci-
sions,
(3) to describe the proportion of patients that
appear to show diﬀerentiation and consolidation
through:
(a) changing which attributes were important
to their decisions, and
(b) changing their ratings of how attractive the
various treatment options are,
(4) to identify aspects of cognitive processing
that are associated with:
(a) the stability of the preferred treatment
option; i.e. the likelihood that the patients
actual treatment decision was the treatment
they preferred at the end of the interview,
and
(b) regret as scored after they had completed
their treatment.
Method
Participants
The participants were consecutive patients
diagnosed with low or medium-risk early-stage
prostate cancer, i.e. patients with stage T1N0/
T2N0 disease, prostate speciﬁc antigen
(PSA) < 20,3 Gleason score <8. They also had
to be able to understand English and be able to
tolerate the interview in the opinion of the
attending radiation oncologist. The study had
ethics approval from the Queen’s University
Health Sciences and Aﬃliated Teaching Hospi-
tals Research Ethics Board.
Procedure – overview
The decision aid is a one-to-one interview with a
research assistant, that occurs between an initial
consultation when the doctor presents the
treatment options to the patient and a second
consultation that occurs about 1 week later
when the treatment decision is made. Thus, the
aid is intended to help the patient become clearer
about which treatment option he prefers in order
to make the decision with his doctor at his next
visit.
This study involved the decision-aid interview,
a ﬁrst follow-up interview (follow-up 1) that
occurred after the patient made his actual
treatment choice with his doctor, and a second
follow-up interview (follow-up 2) that occurred
about 3 months after the treatment decision,
when the acute side-eﬀects of the active treat-
ments would have resolved. Figure 1 shows all
interviews, with all of the activities down the
centre of the ﬁgure (in temporal order from top
to bottom), the interview outputs listed on
the left, and study assessments on the right.
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Interview Begins
Interview Ends
Study AssessmentsDecision Aid Outputs Interview Activities
A. Present information matrix
organization
A. Fill in information matrix
Drop least appealing option 
C. Treatment trade-off on each
quantitative important attribute
Decision aid
Interview
Follow-up 1:
At time of actual
treatment decision
Telephone Interview
Treatment Preference –1
Role Preference –1
Decisional Conflict –1
Comprehension Questions
Treatment Preference –2
TreatmentPreference –3
RolePreference – 2
Decisional Conflict –2
Satisfaction
Actual treatment choice
Treatment Preference –4
Decisional Conflict –3
Patient Evaluation
Pre-info list
Post-info list
Drop-option list
Remaining-options list
Flip differences
Follow-up 2:
3 months after
decision
Telephone Interview Treatment Preference –5Regret
Consider remaining options
B. List important attributes
B. List important attributes
B. List important attributes
B. List important attributes
Figure 1 Order of activities in decision-aid interview. Activities are identiﬁed in the rounded boxes down the central column of
the ﬁgure; they are listed from the top of the ﬁgure down, as they occur chronologically in the interview. Arrows from particular
activity boxes to the left identify outputs of the activity. Arrows from the central column to the right identify additional
assessments included in the interview in order to evaluate the impact of particular aspects of the interview.
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Activities related to each of the three compo-
nents of the decision-aid interview are identiﬁed
with the appropriate letter: (A) the structured
presentation of the information, (B) listing
exercises (the focus of this report; they are
highlighted in grey), and (C) treatment trade-oﬀ
exercises.
Procedure – details
Decision-aid interview
After the patient consented to participate in the
study, his physician identiﬁed which of the three
treatment options were being oﬀered, and some
patients considered only two options while others
considered three. Because the study was run in a
cancer centre, all patients were oﬀered radiation
treatment, but not all oﬀered either surgery
(because of co-morbidities) or oﬀered no treat-
ment for now (often because the doctor felt the
patient was too young). The physician also pro-
vided probability estimates for each of seven
quantitative outcomes relevant for each of
oﬀered treatments that were speciﬁc to that
patient (identiﬁed with an * in Table 1), taking
into account the patient’s age and associated
co-morbidities, if any, in addition to his disease
which we incorporated into the information we
presented to the patient (the physicians were
provided with outcome ranges found in the lit-
erature to anchor their estimates4).
As shown in Fig. 1, the decision-aid inter-
view with a research associate began with
collecting the baseline assessments. Of the
baseline assessments collected, this report fo-
cusses on the treatment preference assessment
(TPA). The assessment requested that the
patient rate each of the treatment options he
was oﬀered on a ﬁve-point ordinal scale: 0,
Do not want this option to 4, Deﬁnitely want
this option.
After the assessments, the information matrix
was presented by ﬁrst outlining how the matrix
was organized and then ﬁlling in the informa-
tion, a strategy intended to facilitate patient
understanding.23 The information addressed
the issues identiﬁed empirically as that which
patients consider important to their decisions,24
Table 1 Information board organization
Category Issue No treatment for now Radiotherapy Surgery
Background What cancer is
How cancer progresses
Where cancer spreads to
Procedure for treatment
Length of time to decide
Seeking a second opinion
Treatment details How the treatment works
When can the treatment start
How to know if the treatment is working
Possible beneﬁts of treatment Chances of PSA rising*
Chances of cancer causing symptoms*
Chances of dying from the cancer*
Effect on how long I will live
Possible harms of treatment Chances of dying from treatment*
Effect on sexual functioning*
Effect on bladder functioning*
Effect on bowel functioning*
Options if treatment does not
work
Options if cancer gets worse
Options if cancer does not disappear
after treatment
Options if cancer comes reappears
What others choose Choices other patients make
Choices doctors make
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with the content to address each issue developed
from the literature as best as could be; physi-
cians then approved of what we presented, they
did not inﬂuence the content at all. Table 1
shows the items included in the presentation and
Table 2 shows the information provided for one
item to show the extent of detail provided. The
patient-speciﬁc outcome estimates provided by
the physician were incorporated into the pres-
entation (in the blanks of Table 2) and were
provided as frequencies out of 100 and presented
in numeric format. Further details of the pres-
entation procedure can be found elsewhere.25
After the matrix labels were introduced, the
patient identiﬁed the attributes important to his
decision (Pre-info list). He listed the attributes in
their order of importance and was encouraged to
list all important attributes, even if they were not
included in the information board. After the
information was presented, the patient was
asked standardized comprehension questions,
and was encouraged to look at the information
board for the answer when he could not recall it.
Following conﬁrmation of his understanding the
information, the patient revised his list of
important attributes if needed (Post-info list)
and completed a second TPA. If he was oﬀered
three treatment options, he then identiﬁed his
least-preferred option to drop from further
consideration, and listed the attributes import-
ant to that drop (Drop-option list). After the
drop, he identiﬁed the attributes important to
the decision between the remaining two options
(Remaining-option list).
Once considering only two options, each
patient completed the treatment trade-oﬀ exer-
cises: one exercise focussed on each quantitative
attribute important to his choice. The quantities
were presented as vertical bars in the exercises.26
We do not focus on the treatment trade-oﬀ
exercises in this report.
After the trade-oﬀ exercises, ﬁnal assessments
were completed and they included four assess-
ments: (1) TPA, (2) a role preference assessed
with Degner & Sloan’s Control Preference
Scale,27 (3) decisional conﬂict assessed with
O’Connor’s Decisional Conﬂict Scale,28 and (4)
satisfaction assessed with Graham’s Satisfaction
with Preparation for Decision Making Scale.29
We focus primarily on the TPA and on three of
the 13 items in the Decisional Conﬂict Scale in
this report. The three items are: (i) I know how
important the beneﬁts of each option are to me in
this decision, (ii) I know how important the risks
and side-eﬀects of each option are to me in this
decision, and (iii) It is hard to decide that the
beneﬁts are more important to me than the risks,
or if the risks are more important. Responses to
each item used a ﬁve-point ordinal scale from
strongly agree to strongly disagree.
The interview ended with the participant
providing demographic information: age, high-
est level of formal education, and partner status.
He was then provided with a printout of the
information matrix to take home with him.
Follow-up 1
After the decision-aid interview, patients were
tracked in the clinic database to identify when
they made their actual treatment choice. At that
time, they completed the ﬁrst follow-up inter-
view, over the phone for all but the 10 patients
as described below in the repeatability study. All
participants had made their treatment decision
at the time of the follow-up 1 interview but none
had started the treatment. As shown in Fig. 1,
this interview included three assessments of
which we only focus on the Treatment Prefer-
ence Assessment in this report.
Follow-up 2
We continued to track patients through the cli-
nic database in order to identify when they
actually started their treatments. The second
follow-up interview, also over the telephone,
took place approximately 3 months after they
started their treatments. At that time, the
patients completed a ﬁnal TPA and an assess-
ment of regret. Regret was measured by
O’Connor’s Regret Scale.30 The Regret Scale has
ﬁve items, each requiring agree/disagree
responses on a ﬁve-point ordinal scale; an indi-
vidual’s regret score was the total of the Regret
Scale, a range of 5 (low regret) to 25 (high
regret). This report focusses on both the two
ﬁnal assessments.
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Table 2 An example of the information provided in the decision aid
Issue No treatment for now Radiotherapy Surgery
Effect on bladder
functioning
If you choose no treatment for now, growth
of the prostate cancer can sometimes
affect your ability to pass urine. This
happens in about four of 100 men in your
situation within 10 years. The problem can
usually be corrected with a day-surgery
procedure.
Temporary:
You will probably need to empty your bladder more
frequently starting in the third or fourth week of
radiation treatment. This happens to about 60 of
100 men who have radiation. Also, you may have
some discomfort when you empty your bladder.
These symptoms last until 2–3 weeks after treatment.
Months or years after radiation treatment, scar
tissue may develop and interfere with the ﬂow of
urine. This happens to about two of 100 men
receiving radiation and can usually be corrected
with a day-surgery procedure.
Permanent:
A few men have to empty their bladder more frequently
after radiation. In addition, some men who have had
radiation develop problems with bladder control:
of these men, __ of 100 have dribbling that requires
a pad to keep their clothes dry; and __lose total control,
needing either an adult diaper or a tube inserted into
their bladder to drain the urine into a bag.
Temporary:
You will lose bladder control and need a catheter
(a tube in your penis) right after the surgery.
Most men regain complete control of their bladder
within a few months. Also, months or years after
surgery, scar tissue may develop and interfere
with the ﬂow of urine. This happens to about two
of 100 men having surgery. It can usually be
corrected with a day-surgery procedure.
Permanent:
About __ of the 100 men who have had surgery
do not regain complete control of their bladder.
__ of 100 men regain some control but have
dribbling that requires a pad to keep their clothes
dry. __ of 100 men do not regain any control,
needing either an adult diaper or a tube inserted
into their bladder to drain the urine into a bag.
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Repeatability study
It is recognized that when decision makers are
facedwith an unusual type of decision, such as the
decision about treatment for prostate cancer,21,22
the decision maker often needs to discover what
he/she values related to the decision,31 suggesting
that this type of decision results in particularly
active diﬀerentiation. Thus, it would be expected
that the attributes considered important to
patients in this study would shift frequently,
especially near the beginning of the decision
process. In spite of the expected changes, we
assessed our method of obtaining important
attributes in order to get a sense of the stability of
the responses that we obtained. We asked 10
patients to return to the location of the original
interview for their ﬁrst follow-up interview (any-
where from one to several weeks later) and to
repeat the listing procedure. The items listed on
their ﬁnal list (Post-info list for thosewhohad two
options andRemaining-options list for those who
had three) of the original interview were then
compared with those listed in the follow-up
interview.
Results
Participants
Of the 70 men who were invited, 60 (86%) chose
to participate in the study; 33 were provided
with three treatment options and 27 with two
options. Participants had a mean age of
65.8 years, with a range of 41–76 years (SD
6.95). Regarding their education: 10% had less
than high school education, 43% had completed
high school, and 47% had some post-secondary
education. Regarding their partner status: 88%
were living with a partner, 5% were single and
7% were widowed or other marital status.
Repeatability study
The 10 patients who participated in the repea-
tability study identiﬁed a mean of 4.3 (range
2–8) important attributes at the end of the ori-
ginal interview and a mean of 4.5 (range 3–7) in
the follow-up interview. Of the total number of
items identiﬁed at both times, a mean of 69.2%
appeared on both lists; a mean of 85.6% of
original interview attributes were repeated in the
follow-up interview. Thus, the overwhelming
majority of attributes identiﬁed as important at
the original interview continued over the time to
be identiﬁed as important; changes over time
(either due to our measurement method or to a
real shift in what was important) were more
often in the direction of adding new attributes to
the list.
Insight into cognitive processes
Objective 1 – attributes important to the decision
There was a wide range in the number of
attributes important to individual patients, in
the actual attributes chosen, and in their rank
order. Overall, the 60 participants identiﬁed 33
diﬀerent items as important to their decisions
when they were selecting their most preferred
option; one additional item was identiﬁed only
when they were considering which option to
drop. Thus, overall, 34 diﬀerent attributes were
identiﬁed as important to the decisions of these
60 patients.
Figure 2 shows the 33 diﬀerent important
attributes identiﬁed by the group when patients
were considering their ﬁnal options (Remaining-
options list for those oﬀered three options and
Post-Info list for those oﬀered two options) and
the proportion of patients that identiﬁed each of
the attributes as important, ranked 1 (most
important) to 4 and greater. As seen in the ﬁg-
ure, for the 60 patients, 18 diﬀerent attributes
were considered the most important attributes to
the decision. The wide variation in important
attributes is further demonstrated by the fact
that only two attributes were important to more
than 50% of patients (eﬀect on bladder func-
tioning, and eﬀect on bowel functioning).
Interestingly, we analysed the attributes with
respect to each treatment option: for each
attribute we calculated the proportion of
patients oﬀered that treatment option who
identiﬁed that attribute as important and found
similar proportions across the three treatment
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options. In addition, there was no diﬀerence in
the number of attributes important to patients
who were oﬀered 3 treatment options (mean 4)
to those oﬀered 2 options (mean 4.3),
[t(58) < 1]. Table 3 shows both the median and
range in number of important attributes on each
of the three lists focussed on choosing a pre-
ferred option.
The Drop-list of attributes (attributes import-
ant to dropping the least-preferred option) was
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of participants
Attribute
Ranked 1st
Ranked 2nd
Ranked 3rd
Ranked ≥ 4th
Legend
Effect on bladder functioning
Chances of PSA rising
Procedure
Effect on sexual functioning
Chances of dying of cancer
Effect on length of life
Effect on quality of life
How treatment works
Doctor's advice
Effect on bowel functioning (colostomy)
Options if cancer doesn't disappear
How to know if treatment is working
Chances of dying from treatment
Chances of symptoms from spread
Effect on ability to work
What other patients choose
Rate tumour grows
What doctor would choose
Effect on usual activities
Time to recover
Effect on family
When treatment can start
Options if cancer gets worse
Doctor's experience
Getting a second opinion
Other side-effects
Options if cancer comes back
Other options (alternatives)
My age
Effect on bowel functioning (meds)
Similar treatment previously
Effect on discomfort
Location
Figure 2 Ranking of attributes important to the decision. The ﬁgure illustrates the treatment attributes that were listed and
identiﬁes the proportion of patients that ranked each attribute as ﬁrst, second, third, and fourth or lower in importance to their
decision. The overall length of each bar indicates the proportion of all patients identifying that attribute as important.
Patient decision-making in prostate cancer, D Feldman-Stewart et al.
 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004 Health Expectations, 7, pp.126–141
134
only relevant to the 33 patients who were oﬀered
three options; of those patients, one man could
not provide a reason to drop one of the options,
thus there were responses from 32 patients. The
median number of attributes underlying the drop
for the 32 patients was 2 (range 1–4), including 10
of these patients who reported non-board items
(median 1, range 1–3). Nineteen of the patients
(58%) identiﬁed at least one attribute on their
drop lists that was not identiﬁed on any of their
other lists and for 11of thepatients (33%), noneof
the attributes on their drop list was on any of the
other lists. The most common attribute underly-
ing the dropwas the procedure involved and that
was important to 14 patients (42.4%). One
attribute was important to the drop that was not
identiﬁed on any of the lists focussed on choosing
the most preferred option: economic factors.
We note that we were concerned that the large
number of items in the board presentation might
overwhelm patients ability to identify items
beyond those presented that were important to
them. Table 3 shows the proportion of patients
who identiﬁed items not presented on the board
(‘‘non-board items’’) in their lists of attributes
important to selecting the preferred option. As
the table shows, a sizable proportion of patients
identiﬁed such items on each of the lists. Overall,
37 of the 60 patients (61.6%) identiﬁed non-
board items in at least one of their important
attribute lists.
Objective 2 – cognitive challenges
Insight into the cognitive challenges faced by
patients was gleaned from their responses to the
three items of the Decisional Conﬂict Scale
identiﬁed in the methods. At the end of the
decision-aid interview 92% of the participants
(strongly) agreed that they were clear about the
importance of the beneﬁts of the options and
88% (strongly) agreed that they were clear about
the importance of the risks and side-eﬀects of the
options. However, 47% (strongly) agreed that it
was hard for them to decide if the beneﬁts or the
risks were important to them in the decision-
making.
Objective 3(a) – changes in important attributes
over decision process
Table 3 also describes the changes that occurred
between the lists, providing us with some insight
into the diﬀerentiation processes. A great num-
ber of important attributes were changed during
the decision process: almost half of the patients
(45%) added to, and a similar proportion (48%)
dropped attributes from, the Pre-Info list when
they listed their important attributes on the
Post-Info list. Of the patients oﬀered only two
options, 78% changed at least one attribute
between the two lists. Similarly, almost
one-third of those completing the Remaining-
options list dropped attributes from their Post-
Info list and 25% added more. Overall, 49
Table 3 A summary of the important attributes identiﬁed by each participant Pre-info, Post-info and when considering
Remaining options
Pre-info
list
Post-info
list
Changes between Pre-
info and Post-info lists
(n ¼ 60)
Remaining-option
list1
Changes between Post-
info and Remaining-op-
tions lists1 (n=33)
Attributes
dropped
Attributes
added
Attributes
dropped
Attributes
added
Participants providing
responses [n (%)]
60 (100) 60 (100) 27 (45) 29 (48) 33 (100) 13 (39) 8 (24)
Number of attributes
[median (range)]
4 (1–16) 4 (1–10) 2 (1–8) 1 (1–4) 2 (0–4) 1 (1–3) 2 (1–3)
Participants who identiﬁed
non-board attributes [n (%)]
25 (42) 32 (53) 10 (30)
1Only patients with three treatment options completed the Remaining-options list (n ¼ 33).
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(81.7%) patients changed, at some point in the
interview, the attributes that they reported as
important to the selection of their treatment
choice.
Objective 3(b) – diﬀerentiation and
consolidation: changes in treatment ratings
Over the three assessments during the decision-
aid interview, 43 (71.7%) patients changed at
least one of their TPA ratings of the treatment
options oﬀered to them. Between the interview
and follow-up 1, 45 patients (75%) changed at
least one of their TPA scores, and between fol-
low-up 1 and follow-up 2, 34 (57%) changed at
least one of their scores. Of the 13 who did not
change their scores in the ﬁrst post-interview
period, 11 (85%) had scored their preferred
option at 4 (maximum) and all other options at 0
(minimum), suggesting they had completed their
diﬀerentiation and consolidation by the earlier
time point; the same was true for 16 of the 22
(73%) who did not change their TPAs in the
second time interval. Only six patients (10%)
started the interview oﬀ with the maximum
separation between TPA scores of their options
and never changed the scores.
Figure 3 shows the average TPA scores for
the most preferred option and for that of its
closest competitor across the 56 patients who
had completed the TPAs at all ﬁve time points
it was assessed in the study, the three in the
interview – when changes would usually reﬂect
diﬀerentiation – and in each of the two follow-
up interviews, when changes reﬂect consolid-
ation. As seen in the ﬁgure, the diﬀerence
between mean TPA score for the most pre-
ferred option and that of its nearest competit-
ior grew signiﬁcantly over the ﬁve time points:
the score of the most preferred option
increased gradually over the entire time, while
that of its closest competitor dropped
[F(4,220) ¼ 16.6, P < 0.001]. Thus, as Diﬀ
Con suggests, the diﬀerence in the attractive-
ness of the most preferred option when
compared with its nearest competitor continued
to increase over the whole of the study.
Objective 4(a) – cognitive processes associated
with stability of preferred treatment option
At the beginning of the interview 17 (28%) of
the patients did not have a clear treatment
preference, as indicated by ties in top TPA
scores; by the end of the interview, only ﬁve of
them still did not have a treatment preference –
three of them changed their TPA scores, but this
did not resolve the tie. Five additional patients
had TPA scores that were tied at the end of the
interview but not earlier. Thus, at the end of the
interview, 50 (83%) patients had a clear treat-
ment preference; of the 10 patients who did not
have a clear preference, nine had been oﬀered all
three treatment options. It is interesting to note
that while the changes in TPA scores [described
in the results addressing Objective 3(b)] suggest
that three-fourths of our patients were actively
changing their attitudes towards the options
oﬀered to them, those changes were not sug-
gested when looking at which option patients
0
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Figure 3 Mean TPA scores for most
preferred option and for its nearest
competitor during the study. The ﬁg-
ure illustrates that the mean TPA score
for the most preferred option increased
in a linear manner throughout the
decision-aid interview, and continued
to do so after the actual decision was
made. The ﬁgure also illustrates how
the mean TPA score for the nearest
competitor dropped in a step fashion
between the end of the decision-aid
interview and follow-up 1, when the
treatment decision was made.
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preferred over the course of the interview; of the
43 who had a treatment preference at the
beginning of the interview, 32 (74% of that
group) did not change that preference during the
interview.
Of the 50 who had a treatment preference at
the end of the interview, 38 (76%) chose that
preferred option as their actual treatment, and
we describe their having the same preferences at
the two time points as their preferences being
consistent. Consistency of the preference was
not associated with the size of the diﬀerence in
TPA scores between the most preferred option
and its nearest competitor, as measured either at
the end of the interview (odds ratio 1.38, 95%
CI: 0.80–2.37) or at the time of follow-up 1
(odds ratio 0.87, 95% CI: 0.44–1.72). However,
the consistency was associated with increasing
diﬀerences in the TPA score between the most
preferred option and the TPA score of its nearest
competitor between the interview and follow-up
1 (odds ratio 2.1, 95% CI: 1.40–3.14). Thus, it
appears that the relationship between TPA
scores and whether patients actually chose the
option that had the highest TPA score at the end
of the interview is complex. The association
appears to be with the shift in the diﬀerence
between the preferred option and its competit-
iors, rather than with the size of the diﬀerence at
any particular point in time.
Objective 4(b) – cognitive processes associated
with regret
The range of regret scores was 5–14 (recall that
the scale is 5–25) with a mean of 8.4; six patients
scored above 10. The degree of regret was not
associated with the diﬀerence in the TPA scores
of the most preferred option and it nearest
competitor, as measured at either follow-up 1 or
at follow-up 2 [both F(1,54) < 1]. However,
regret scores were negatively associated with the
shifts in the diﬀerence in the two TPA scores:
regret scores decreased as the diﬀerence in TPA
scores of the most preferred option and its
nearest competitor increased from the interview
to follow-up 2 [F(1,54) ¼ 4.27, P < 0.05]
and from follow-up 1 to follow-up 2
[F(1,53) ¼ 7.28, P < 0.01]. Thus, similar to the
above association with shifts in TPA scores, it
seems that patients experience less regret as the
diﬀerence in the TPA scores between the two
highest options increases. In other words, if
diﬀerentiation is increasing, patients tend to feel
less regret.
Discussion
Our cognitive approach to the design and
implementation of a decision aid has provided
us with some insights into the patients cognitive
decision processes. The ﬁrst insight is that there
is wide variation from one patient to the next in
attributes that aﬀect their treatment decisions,
consistent with the wide variation that we found
in our retrospective survey of patient informa-
tion needs for decision-making.24 The variation
in patient values may not be particularly sur-
prising (although we are not aware of it being
documented speciﬁcally for the decision by
others), but it does have important implications
both for supporting patient involvement in this
treatment decision and for studies of the popu-
lation. Systems designed to support individual
patient involvement must be able to accommo-
date the variation but in a manner that limits
cognitive burden caused by addressing issues
irrelevant to the individual; and, the two-thirds
of our patients who identiﬁed attributes not
included in our original list suggests that our
approach to this issue is reasonable. In studying
the population, the wide variation implies that a
large number of attributes are required to cover
the concerns of the population – and, our rep-
eatability study suggests that, if anything, our
results may underestimate that number. The
large number of concerns suggests that the rel-
atively few health states considered in decision
analyses models of this decision32–35 miss salient
aspects of the decision important to a large
number of patients.
A second insight is how frequently patients
changed their report of important attributes and
changed their evaluations of the treatment
options oﬀered to them. We acknowledge that
some of the changes we found may be due to
random eﬀects and perhaps to our methods,
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e.g. narrowing patients focus to two of the three
options. But, even of those patients who were
oﬀered only two options, 78% modiﬁed the
attributes important to their choice. Thus, it is
likely that a large part of the observed changes
was due to the patients still discovering which
attributes were important to their decisions and
how to integrate them. We point out that all our
patients had had at least two consultations with
specialists (a urologist and a radiation oncolo-
gist) before arriving at the decision-aid inter-
view. Thus, they had both more time and more
professional input than many patients who face
this type of treatment decision. We recognize
that going to two specialists may have, in fact,
confused them through receiving some contra-
dictory information. However, most of the
urologists and all the radiation oncologists in
our area knew (and approved) the information
that we provided. It is likely, therefore, that the
doctors were less contradictory than patients
typically face. It is also possible that some of the
shift during the interview was due to the patients
becoming less inﬂuenced by the physicians
preferences; again, because of the physician
awareness of our study, it is likely that such
inﬂuence would be minimized relative to what
patients might otherwise encounter. Regardless
of its source, the extent of changes in attributes
and in treatment ratings demonstrated in this
study emphasizes the dynamic nature of the
decision process.
The fact that we found that patients were less
likely to change TPA scores at later time points
suggests that the decision does get consolidated.
We recognize that the TPA measure could hide
continuing shifts in important attributes reﬂective
of continuing diﬀerentiation/consolidation.
However, as Diﬀ Con suggests, we observed an
increasing proportion of patients over time
whose TPA scores for their preferred option was
the maximum score and the scores for all other
alternatives was the minimum, and that both the
stability of treatment choice and less regret were
associated with that increase in diﬀerence in
TPA scores. The pattern of changes that we
observed raises questions about helping patients
with their decision using a process that does not
recognize diﬀerentiation which is extended in
time; e.g. a simple application of decision ana-
lysis would produce utilities at a particular point
in time. However, continuing diﬀerentiation
could result in the patient’s utilities shifting,
possibly quite considerably as that which occurs
when an attribute is in conﬂict with the general
preference for a particular treatment.36
A third insight relates to the fact that almost
one-third of our patients identiﬁed attributes
when they considered dropping their least
favoured option that were not otherwise men-
tioned. Discussions of treatment decision-
making do not typically include a distinction
between selecting a most-preferred and a least-
preferred option. As Diﬀ Con and other pro-
cess theories of decision-making suggest,9
however, early stages of decision-making are
frequently focussed on screening out options.
These results suggest that when there are more
than two options, if screening out options is
not explicitly built into the process, important
attributes may be overlooked and we may in
turn increase the complexity of the decision for
the patients.
A fourth insight was gained by focussing on
diﬀerentiation and consolidation. Both the sta-
bility of the patients treatment choices and the
extent of their regret after the decision appear to
be related to whether the patients evaluations of
the options were still increasingly in favour of
their initial treatment preference. The reasons
for the increasing divergence may be quite
complicated; e.g. as already mentioned,
Svenson36 has noted that when an attribute is in
conﬂict with the preferred option, we often
reduce the importance of that attribute. In
addition to diﬀerentiation that is inherent to all
decisions, we recognize that some of the
observed change in preference after the decision-
aid interview could be due to physician prefer-
ences swaying the patient. Although we do not
know why the patients in this study were chan-
ging their assessments of the various treatment
options, it does appear that increasing diver-
gence in the assessments was associated with
better stability and less regret, and we note that
the observation provides support for Diﬀ Con.
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While we have gained some insight into how
individual patients viewed particular attributes,
the aid did not provide us with information about
how patients actually weighed each attribute as
they arrived at their preferred option. The fact
that a high proportion of our participants found
it hard to decide if risks or beneﬁts were more
important raises questions about whether the
trade-oﬀ exercises could be improved upon as a
method for helping patients weigh and integrate
the attributes that are important to them. These
results suggest that further study of patients
cognitive weighing and integrating processes is
required. Part of our plan is to use qualitative
research methods in exit interviews to gain some
insight into these processes.
O’Connor and colleagues review of decision-
aid studies2 noted that decision aids were more
likely to alter the choice of patients who were
undecided before using the aid than those who
had an initial inclination and our results are
consistent with that observation. We would
argue, however, that decision aids also oﬀer
potential beneﬁts to patients who appear to have
a preferred treatment option prior to using the
aid. The most obvious beneﬁt to an already-
decided group is to ensure that their choice is
based on fact and not on misconception. The
potential beneﬁts that result from the unique
goal of decision aids to clarify patients values is
less obvious. We argue that through values cla-
riﬁcation, a decision aid can promote diﬀeren-
tiation and consolidation, thereby reducing the
likelihood that patients will experience regret. As
already mentioned, Diﬀ Con identiﬁes that we
often use post-decisional restructuring to reduce
the likelihood that we will experience regret. Our
data demonstrate that although over half of our
participants had a preferred treatment at the
beginning of the interview – and did not change
that preference – almost all showed evidence of
diﬀerentiation/consolidation. Our evidence that
increasing diﬀerentiation/consolidation was
associated with less early regret suggests that
patients with an apparent treatment preference
could use the decision-aid interview to consol-
idate their choices, and hence reduce the likeli-
hood they will regret the decision later.
We conclude that our approach of basing
decision-aid development on a cognitive process
theory of decision-making helps us create a
product that could both help patients and pro-
vide us with some insight into their cognitive
processing that may, in turn, help us to be even
more eﬀective. Guided by Diﬀ Con, our obser-
vations of diﬀerentiation/consolidation and its
relationships to stability of choice and to regret
suggest that values clariﬁcation exercises in
decision aids may want to focus on encouraging
diﬀerentiation processes. Our observations that
decision processes are related to regret, even
expressions of early regret, support the use of
regret as a primary outcome for the evaluation
of decision aids.
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